Potentiality and Contradiction in Quantum Mechanics

Following J.-Y.B\'eziau in his pioneer work on non-standard interpretations of the traditional square of opposition, we have applied the abstract structure of the square to study the relation of opposition between states in superposition in orthodox quantum mechanics in \cite{are14}. Our conclusion was that such states are \ita{contraries} (\ita{i.e.} both can be false, but both cannot be true), contradicting previous analyzes that have led to different results, such as those claiming that those states represent \ita{contradictory} properties (\ita{i. e.} they must have opposite truth values). In this chapter we bring the issue once again into the center of the stage, but now discussing the metaphysical presuppositions which underlie each kind of analysis and which lead to each kind of result, discussing in particular the idea that superpositions represent potential contradictions. We shall argue that the analysis according to which states in superposition are contrary rather than contradictory is still more plausible

Does weak discernibility determine metaphysics?

Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist

Axiomatization and Models of Scientific Theories

In this paper we discuss two approaches to the axiomatization of scien- tific theories in the context of the so called semantic approach, according to which (roughly) a theory can be seen as a class of models. The two approaches are associated respectively to Suppes’ and to da Costa and Chuaqui’s works. We argue that theories can be developed both in a way more akin to the usual mathematical practice (Suppes), in an informal set theoretical environment, writing the set theoretical predicate in the language of set theory itself or, more rigorously (da Costa and Chuaqui), by employing formal languages that help us in writing the postulates to define a class of structures. Both approaches are called internal, for we work within a mathematical framework, here taken to be first-order ZFC. We contrast these approaches with an external one, here discussed briefly. We argue that each one has its strong and weak points, whose discussion is relevant for the philosophical foundations of science

Identical particles in quantum mechanics: favouring the Received View

The so-called Received View (RV) on quantum non-individuality states, basically, that quantum particles are not individuals. It has received an amount of criticism in the recent literature, most of it concerning the relation between the RV and the relation of identity. In this chapter we carefully characterise a family of concepts involved in clarifying the view, indicating how the very idea of failure of identity, commonly used to define the RV, may be understood. By doing so, we hope to dissipate some misunderstandings about the RV, which shall also be seen as evidence of its tenability

Identical particles in quantum mechanics: favouring the Received View

The so-called Received View (RV) on quantum non-individuality states, basically, that quantum particles are not individuals. It has received an amount of criticism in the recent literature, most of it concerning the relation between the RV and the relation of identity. In this chapter we carefully characterise a family of concepts involved in clarifying the view, indicating how the very idea of failure of identity, commonly used to define the RV, may be understood. By doing so, we hope to dissipate some misunderstandings about the RV, which shall also be seen as evidence of its tenability

The roads to non-individuals (and how not to read their maps)

Ever since its beginnings, standard quantum mechanics has been associated with a metaphysical view according to which the theory deals with non-individual objects, i.e., objects deprived of individuality in some sense of the term. We shall examine the grounds of the claim according to which quantum mechanics is so closely connected with a metaphysics of non-individuals. In particular, we discuss the attempts to learn the required `metaphysical lessons' required by quantum mechanics coming from four distinct roads: from the formalism of the theory, treating separately the case of the physics and the underlying logic; from the ontology of the theory, understood as the furniture of the world according to the theory; and, at last, we analyze whether a metaphysics of non-individuals is indispensable from a purely metaphysical point of view. We argue that neither non-individuality nor individuality is not to be found imposed on us in any of these levels so that it should be seen as a metaphysical addition to the theory, rather than as a lesson from it.Comment: Forthcoming in J. R. B. Arenhart, R. W. Arroyo (eds.), Non-Reflexive Logics, Non-Individuals, and the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: Essays in Honour of the Philosophy of D\'ecio Krause, Springer, Synthese Library 476, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31840-5_

Making Sense of Non-Individuals in Quantum Mechanics

In this work, we focus on a very specific case study: assuming that quantum theories deal with “particles” of some kind (point particles in orthodox non-relativistic quantum mechanics, field excitations in quantum field theories), what kind of entity can such particles be? One possible answer, the one we shall examine here, is that they are not the usual kind of object found in daily life: individuals. Rather, we follow a suggestion by Erwin Schrödinger, according to which quantum mechanics poses a revolutionary kind of entity: non-individuals. While physics, as a scientific field, is not concerned with whether entities posited by a specific physical theory are individuals or not, answering this question is part of the quest for a better understanding of physical reality. Here lies, in large measure, the relevance of ontology

The Non-Individuals Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

The non-individuals interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented with the aim of clarifying it and highflying some of its salient features. Alternative formulations of it are proposed and examined